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The aim of this paper is to understand the functioning and the scope of self-help groups in the
informal settlements of urban areas as a means of generating income for poor households. The paper
uses a unique dataset collected by the author in 1999 surveying all individual group members from
several informal settlements of Nairobi. It studies the individual determinants of earnings within
groups and relates group composition to various indicators of group functioning. Sex, age and ethnic
identity are among the most important determinants of individual reliance on group income and of
access to group loans. Heterogeneity in earnings among members is shown to reduce their ability to
borrow from the group as a whole but not from each other. The impact of ethnic and other forms of
heterogeneity on the division of labor, choice of compensation schemes, sanctioning technology and
recruitment criteria is also described.
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Recent years have seen a growing interest on behalf of economists and other social scientists in the role
played by groups in the process of economic development. Drawing upon the conceptual framework
of Putnam (1993), some studies have looked at civic engagement in a variety of associations, including
recreational and socio-political ones, to argue that the mere participation in such groups can have
an economic impact by providing opportunities for members to share information, enforce informal
transactions, and coordinate on cooperative outcomes.1 Other studies have focused on the role
of groups in the informal credit market and have analyzed their incentive schemes and economic
performance.2 For some of the poorest individuals in developing countries, however, groups are more
than socio-political associations or saving devices: they are ‘employers’. People who do not have
access to the formal labor market and whose options in the informal market are relatively unattractive
can often bene…t from pooling resources and working in groups. To what extent can informal groups
constitute a reliable source of income for the poor? What factors a¤ect group performance, and in
particular, how does the ‘social’ composition of the group a¤ect the organization of production and
the allocation of resources to members?
This paper attempts to address the above questions by employing a unique dataset on ‘self-help’
groups with income generating activities collected by the author in the informal settlements of Nairobi
in 1999. Information has been collected on each and every member of the surveyed groups, which
allows to construct exact measures of the composition of the group in terms of income, education, age
and ethnicity. This is particularly important when investigating the impact of heterogeneity on group
performance. The advantage of this methodology compared to the studies that infer within-group
heterogeneity from the heterogeneity of the population at large is that it accounts for the possibility
that people sort into groups that are more or less heterogeneous than the whole population. By having
a ‘census’ of the entire group, the matching between group composition and individual outcomes can
1In the context of developing countries, see for example the work of Narayan and Pritchett (1999), Grootaert (1999),
and Isham (2001).
2See the surveys by Besley (1995) on ROSCAs and other nonmarket institutions, and by Ghatak and Guinnane
(1999) on group lending.
1thus be estimated more precisely.
The main …ndings of the empirical analysis can be summarized as follows. First, within each
group individual earnings increase with age and decrease with the number of years the individual
has been living in the current place. The time spent in the group, as a proxy for experience, has
a positive but insigni…cant impact on earnings, suggesting that the notion of ‘seniority’ rewarded
by these groups is strictly related to age. Second, women and young people are relatively more
dependent on group activities for their living, while adult males often have an alternative source of
income. ‘Dependency’ is also negatively correlated to the income that the individual was earning
before joining the group, suggesting that group production serves a particularly crucial function for
members with low ‘outside options’. Third, among the most valuable functions of these groups is
that of giving access to loans to otherwise credit constrained individuals. About 64 percent of the
respondents say that in case of need they borrow from the group as a whole or from individual
members. The most important factor to gain access to such loans seems to be speaking the same
language of the chairperson: ceteris paribus, members of the same ethnic group as the chairperson
are 20 to 25 percentage points more likely to borrow from the group or from other members. Fourth,
while ethnic fragmentation and wealth inequality do not a¤ect the likelihood of borrowing, inequality
in group earnings has a negative and signi…cant e¤ect. The e¤ect is particularly strong in groups
that experienced …nancial losses, suggesting that when the available capital to lend is particularly
scarce and members are not remunerated ‘uniformly’ it may be di¢cult to reach consensus on who
should get a loan. This hypothesis is corroborated by the fact that when loans from the group as a
whole are distinguished from loans from individual members, earnings inequality negatively a¤ects
the former but not the latter. Finally, apart from a¤ecting the allocation of loans, heterogeneity
seems to in‡uence the organization of production. In more ethnically heterogeneous groups it is less
common for members to specialize in di¤erent task and more likely that everyone does the same job.
Also, ethnic fragmentation seems to be associated with remuneration schemes in which every worker
gets the same …xed amount, rather than being paid on the basis of the number of hours worked or
the number of items produced. Again, this may be due to the relative di¢culty of reaching consensus
in heterogenous groups. The ability to sanction free riding behavior on contributions to the group
2is also negatively related to ethnic fragmentation, while that of sanctioning absenteeism and other
irregular behavior is not. Finally, no pattern emerges between group composition and the criteria
for recruiting new members.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 brie‡y reviews the related lit-
erature. Section 3 describes the setting, starting with a description of the informal sector and of
self-help groups in Kenya and then moving to the speci…c data used in this paper. Section 4 con-
tains econometric results on income generation, access to credit, and the organization of production.
Section 5 concludes.
2 Background literature
The issue of heterogeneity and group participation has received increasing attention in recent years.
Alesina and La Ferrara (2000) analyze the impact of racial, ethnic, and income heterogeneity on
individual propensity to join socio-political associations in the US and …nd that it has a negative
e¤ect. La Ferrara (2001) models the role of wealth inequality in villages where people have the
choice of joining groups that provide di¤erent net bene…ts to the rich and the poor, and shows that
when access is unrestricted, higher village inequality translates into lower participation because the
relatively rich opt out of the groups. Both papers di¤er from the present work in two respects. First of
all, they address the question of how groups form (what determines the likelihood that an individual
will join), and not how they function. Secondly, they relate group formation to “society wide”
heterogeneity as opposed to within-group heterogeneity. In fact, the link tested by those papers is
from inequality (or racial fragmentation) in the “pool” from which members are drawn, to individual
choices regarding group participation. While this paper employs exact indexes of within group
heterogeneity, it has the limitation of taking membership as exogenous, without accounting for the
motivations that may induce people to join homogeneous versus heterogeneous groups. Developing
a comprehensive framework (and suitable data) to account for both group formation and internal
group composition and functioning seems an important task for future work.
A strand of the literature which is closer to the current paper is the one on heterogeneity and
group performance. This has been explored in the context of project maintenance by Khwaja (2000),
3who uses project level data on 132 community-maintained infrastructure projects in the Himalayas.
The author …nds that, ceteris paribus, socially heterogeneous communities have poorly maintained
projects, and that the relationship between maintenance and inequality in projects returns is U-
shaped. Miguel (2000) and Gugerty and Miguel (2001) analyze the e¤ect of ethnic diversity on school
funding and school organization in Kenyan villages. Both studies …nd that ethnic fragmentation is
associated with worse outcomes, and suggest mechanisms though which this e¤ect may be generated.
In particular, Gugerty and Miguel …nd that the more racially heterogeneous the pupils’ population,
the lower are parental participation in school activities, school committee attendance, and teacher
attendance and motivation. The authors suggest that these results may be due to the fact that
social sanctions apply within ethnic groups, hence fragmented communities have lower scope for
sanctioning noncooperative behavior. In a recent study, Karlan (2001) examines the impact of
members’ composition on savings and repayment performance in group lending programs o¤ered by
a Peruvian organization. The author focuses on geographic and ‘cultural’ dispersion (Western versus
indigenous) and …nds that both types of heterogeneity increase the probability of defaulting on group
loans. As for savings, which can be viewed as a form of ‘collective’ good to the extent that capital is
lent back to the members, geographic distance among the members signi…cantly reduces saving rates,
while cultural dissimilarity has a negligible e¤ect. Finally, Wydick (1999) estimates the determinants
of repayment performance and of intra-group insurance in a sample of 137 borrowing groups from
Guatemala, and …nds that ‘social ties’ (as measured by the number of years members have known
each other and by the degree of friendship and social interaction before and after joining the group)
have a negligible impact on group performance. What seems to matter most is the availability of
sanctioning mechanisms and the possibility of monitoring (as proxied by geographical distance and
knowledge of each other’s business).
The present study builds upon the above literature with a few signi…cant modi…cations. First,
it considers groups that provide the main source of income for most of the members. In other
words, individuals’ stake in these groups is particularly high in this case as compared to project
maintenance groups or school committees, and possibly even to borrowing groups, in that members
mostly depend on production activities organized within these groups for their daily living. As such,
4it is important to investigate what determines individual earnings and the ‘dependency rate’ on group
income, as well as group performance. And even when the attention is on the latter, we may expect
the e¤ects of characteristics such as heterogeneity to be ampli…ed –and possibly di¤erent– in this
context. Secondly, as will be described in the next section, the setting in which these groups operate
is as precarious and socially disrupted as one may conceive, due to the virtual absence of property
rights in the squatter communities and to the high degree of in and out-migration. This can also be
expected to have an impact on group functioning. Finally, compared to some of the above studies
in which the degree of heterogeneity and other group characteristics were estimated based on the
leaders’ evaluation, a key ingredient of the survey methodology in this study was to interview all
members of each group and to compare their ‘subjective’ assessments with ‘objective’ measures of
group composition. This reveals some interesting di¤erences, for example, in the case of wealth and
income inequality.
Before turning to the description of the setting in which the data was collected, it is useful
to compare this study to the earlier work by Abraham, Baland and Platteau (1998). The authors
surveyed 510 households from one of the most populated informal settlements of Nairobi, Kibera,
collecting data on participation in di¤erent types of groups and on the socio-economic background
of the respondents. The groups are then divided into several categories, such as rotating savings
and credit associations, burial societies, health groups, etc. and their main characteristics in terms
of organizational structure, contributions, and composition are examined. While similar for the
context, the present paper di¤ers from the work of Abraham et al. in three respects. First, their
approach is purely descriptive, while this paper employs multivariate analysis. Second, among their
respondents some are members of a group and some are not, so they could estimate participation
rates but not know who else is in the same group of a respondent. In this paper no participation
regression can be run, because every respondent is by de…nition member of some group, but the
identity and characteristics of all other group members are known. Finally, the data of Abraham et
al. has a broader coverage, including groups with and without investment or production activities,
while in this paper the focus is on groups with income generating activities.
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3.1 Informal settlements and self-help groups in Nairobi
I ti se s t i m a t e dt h a ti n1 9 9 3m o r et h a n5 5p e r c e n to ft h ep o p u l a t i o no fN a i r o b il i v e di n‘ i n f o r m a l
settlements’, i.e. squatter communities where inhabitants have no legal right or at most a quasi-
legal right, in the form of temporary occupation right from the Local Authority or a letter from
the Chief.3 These informal settlements in turn cover less than 6 percent of Nairobi’s residential
area, which leads to an average density of 250 dwellings and 750 persons per hectare as compared to
about 10 to 30 dwellings and 50 to 180 persons per hectare in upper and middle income areas (Alder
et al. (1993)). Until the late 1970s the government policy was to demolish informal settlements
throughout the country, while since the early 1980s they gradually became tacitly accepted, with
occasional episodes of demolition and resettlement of the population to other areas (for example, in
Nairobi Muoroto and Kibagare in 1990, Mitumba in 1993). Uncertainty over basic property rights
adds to that over land tenure to generate a pattern of extreme insecurity where almost no investment
is made in infrastructure and local public goods. Dwellings are entirely made of temporary materials
such as mud, wattle and timber o¤cut, and waste disposal is done on the street and in the rivers.
Most sites have virtually no sewerage systems and hygienic conditions are extremely poor.
The inhabitants of squatter communities usually work in the informal sector. Most of them
are involved in hawking, are occasionally employed for the day, or operate small businesses without
licenses. A non-negligible fraction is also involved in illegal activities. Particular relevance have small
businesses known as “jua kali”, which encompass manufacturing activities, repair and services, and
employ a large number of mechanics, carpenters and construction workers that serve other areas of
Nairobi as well.4 The attitude of the City Council has historically been that of discouraging this type
of employment, but in recent years the o¢cial stand on this issue has shifted, possibly in recognition
that the lack of employment opportunities in the formal sector for many slum dwellers called for
3Technically, when some form of legal rights exists these may not be viewed as “squatter communities”, but in this
paper that terms will be used interchangeably with “informal settlements” and “slum”.
4The term “jua kali” was originally created to indicate people who work “under the sun” with no permanent
structure, but has extended to represent the whole informal small business sector.
6alternative forms of employment. Public opinion and policy makers have thus started to view the
jua kali sector as a valuable opportunity for unemployed youth to enter the (informal) labor market
and contribute to domestic product generation (Otieno Okumu (1999)).
Jua kali workers may have formal education, but they often receive informal training on the job,
for which they may have to pay their employer (Ng’ethe and Ndua (1985)). In addition to training
costs, people who want to start their own business need start up capital which, though limited
compared to licensed businesses, may be far beyond the possibilities of a typical slum dweller. For
this reason it is becoming increasingly common among the urban poor to join resources and form the
so called “self-help” groups, which operate in the informal sector with income generating activities
similar to those of individual jua kali workers, but are organized approximately as a production
cooperative. The degree of formalization of these groups, as well as their stability and the scope of
their activities, vary a lot. It seems therefore valuable to undertake a …rst step towards a quantitative
assessment of the economic potential of these groups and of the determinants of their economic
performance.
3.2 The data
The data used in the empirical analysis below was collected by the author in the months of July
and August 1999 in …ve among the most populated informal settlements of Nairobi: Dandora,
Gikomba, Kayole, Korogocho, and Mathare Valley. In consultation with local community workers,
a list of the self-help groups active in these areas was prepared and twenty groups were selected to
be interviewed, based on their location, type of activity, size, age and sex of the members.5 Ak e y
requirement was that the group had some type of income generating activity (though not necessarily
the only activity of the group). Income generating activities in the sample span as di¤erent …elds
as crafts-making (wood carving, basket weaving, etc.), tailoring, garbage recycling, education and
health services, informal lending, etc. Preliminary meetings were set up with the chairperson and
secretary of each group, and a list of all active members was obtained. Based on this list, individual
5T h ec r i t e r i o nw a st oh a v es o m ed e g r e eo fd i v e r s i … c a t i o na m o n gt h eg r o u p si nt e r m so fs i z e ,p r o d u c t i v ea c t i v i t i e s
and location, as well as age and gender of their members.
7interviews were scheduled with each member for the survey modules on demographics, income, and
personal assessment of group functioning. An additional module was administered separately to the
chairperson, the treasurer, and the secretary of each group to gather information on the history,
organizational structure, and costs and revenues of the group. Given that the methodology of this
study required a complete survey of all participants in the group, only groups for which at least 90
percent of the members were successfully interviewed were retained in the sample. This leaves us with
18 groups for a total of 303 individual members. While the sample is certainly not representative of
all groups in the informal settlements of Nairobi, it can provide a reasonable representation of small
and medium-sized groups with a focus on income generation and a low degree of formalization.
[Insert table 1]
As can be seen from table 1, the groups in the sample di¤er substantially in terms of size and
of the number of years they have been in place. The smallest group has 6 members and the largest
has 30, with an average of 14 members per group. The average group has been in place for almost 5
years, with a minimum of 9 months and a maximum of 16 years. Groups are mostly mixed in terms
of gender, with 33 percent of them being all-women and 11 percent being all men. These …gures are
not surprising, given the prominent role of women groups in the informal sector of most developing
countries. The average group member is 31 years old, but this …gure hides substantial di¤erences in
the sample: the ‘youngest’ group has a mean age of its members equal to 19, and the ‘oldest’ group
of 60. Approximately 10 percent of the respondents has no formal schooling, 48.4 percent has Class
1-8, and the rest has higher education. This is an important piece of evidence because it shows that
in the reality of urban informal settlements with strong barriers to entry in the formal labor market,
s e l f - h e l pg r o u p sc a t e rn o to n l yt ou n s k i l l e dw o r k e r s .F i n a l l y ,m e m b e r s ’w e a l t hw a sa s s e s s e do nt h e
basis of ownership of a basket of durable consumption goods such as radio, TV, camera, bike, car,
stove, electric or gas cooker, stove, clock, sofa, bed and mattress, weighted by an estimate of their
prices in the informal market.6 Based on this index, the average respondent owned durables for 7,379
6The average prices for these items on the second hand market at the time of the interview were as follows (in Ksh).
Byke: 4000, car: 180000, electric cooker: 4800, gas cooker: 4500, stove: 400, charcoal burner: 200, sofa: 4500, bed:
2000, mattress: 1100, mat: 350, radio: 700, tv: 4000, camera: 2000, wall clock: 900.
8Kenyan Shillings (Ksh), which amounted to 99.6 US dollars in August 1999 prices. Groups di¤ered
substantially in wealth, though, with the average member of the ‘poorest’ group having 2,450 Ksh,
and that of the richest having ten times as much.
In what follows we turn to multivariate analysis to investigate how individual and aggregate
characteristics a¤ect the economic performance of these groups.
4 Empirical results
4.1 Income generation
The …rst aspect to be considered is the potential for income generation provided by these groups.
One can estimate the following earnings function:
yij = Xij¯ + Dj° + "ij (1)
where yij is the log of hourly earnings of individual i in group j, Xij is a vector of individual
characteristics, Dj if a set of group dummies, and "ij is an error term. Individual characteristics,
which should capture labor productivity, include sex, marital status, age, education, and experience
(proxied by the number of years the respondent has been in the group), as well as language dummies.
A non-linear speci…cation is chosen for age, education and experience, to allow for nonlinearities in the
returns to human capital. Group …xed e¤ects are introduced to control for di¤erences in remuneration
schemes across activities.
[Insert table 2]
Table 2 reports coe¢cient estimates for (1), with White-robust standard errors in parenthesis.
Group dummies are omitted from the table, but a standard F test in all cases rejects the null that
their coe¢cients are jointly equal to zero. When a small set of demographic controls is included
(column1), the only signi…cant determinant of hourly earnings is age: within each group there are
positive but decreasing returns to age. Surprisingly education is not signi…cant (the omitted category
is people with no formal education), nor are sex and marital status. Column 2 introduces two more
9regressors: the number of years the respondent has been working in the group (and its square), and
the number of years he or she has been living in the current place of residence. The coe¢cients
on the former variable are positive but not statistically signi…cant: in these groups there seem to
be returns to ‘seniority’ in the sense of age, but not in the sense of experience. As for the latter
variable, residential stability has a negative and signi…cant e¤ect on individual earnings. This is
not surprising if we consider that the areas of study are probably the poorest and most degraded of
urban Nairobi, so having resided somewhere else probably means higher ‘unobserved ability’. This
interpretation may also help explain while the experience variable is not signi…cant. On the one hand,
spending more years in the group increases job-speci…c skills; on the other hand, to the extent that
high ability workers may be the …rst ones to quit for formal jobs, length of work within the group
may end up capturing low ability. In an attempt to control for this, column 3 introduces among
the regressors individual earnings before joining the group (in log). The previous results remain
virtually unchanged and past earnings are insigni…cant, indicating that this variable is a poor proxy
for unobserved ability.7
In column 4 a set of language dummies is introduced to control for whether the respondent is
Kikuyu, Luo, or Kamba (the omitted category is Luhya and other ethnicities). Furthermore, the
dummy ‘Dominant language’ takes value 1 if the individual speaks the same language as the majority
of other group members, and zero otherwise. This is aimed at capturing possible ethnic favoritism,
as found for example by Collier and Garg (1999) in the Ghanaian labor market. As can be seen
from the table, the coe¢cient on this variable is not statistically di¤erent from zero. A possible
explanation is that when the decision process is not democratic, what counts is not belonging to
the majority, but being the same ethnicity as the leaders. The last column introduces a dummy for
whether the respondent speaks the same language as the chairperson of the group when decisions are
reported to be made by leaders as opposed to democratically, but the conclusion remains the same.
7This is not too surprising, given the heterogeneity of the sample in terms of age: for young respondents low pre-
group earnings may simply re‡ect an out-of-the-labor-force status during school years, while for older ones the same is
not true.
10The coe¢cient on this variable is positive but not statistically signi…cant.8
A second aspect to consider in order to assess the role of these groups for income generation is to
what extent they o¤er better earning opportunities compared to individual jobs in the informal sector.
When asked what was the most important reason for joining the group, 39% of the respondents said
that they did not have another job, 25% said that they had a job but the job the group was better,
19% indicated the access to side bene…ts such as health or training opportunities, and the rest gave
other reasons. At …rst sight, then, the answer to the above question is not obvious. A possible way
to rephrase the question is to ask to what extent people are dependent on these groups as their main
source of income, and estimate the determinants of this ‘dependency ratio’ through multivariate
analysis.
[Insert table 3]
The dependent variable in table 3 is the ratio of individual income earned in the group over total
individual income, expressed in percentage. The sample average for this variable is 75%, indicating
a fairly high dependence on group earnings. The controls in columns 1 to 3 are the same as those
introduced in table 2. The single most important correlate of group dependency is gender: other
things equal, the share of women’s income coming from the group is about 11 percentage points
higher than that of men. Though not statistically signi…cant at conventional levels, the coe¢cients
on the age variables show that group dependency declines as members become older, suggesting
that these groups may serve a particularly valuable function for young people who do not have
access to alternative jobs. Column 4 attempts to control for alternative employment opportunities
by introducing among the regressors the income that the individual was earning before joining the
group. Interestingly, this variable is negative and highly signi…cant: people who were earning more in
the past are less dependent on the group to earn a living. Notice also that from column 4 dependency
decreases with education up to Form 4 level, as one should expect.9
8The variable ‘Chair’s language’ is an interaction between a dummy equal to 1 if the language of the respondent is
the same as that of the chariperson, and a dummy equal to 1 if the respondent declares that ‘leaders decide’ in the
group. Using only the former dummy also yielded an insigni…cant result.
9The co¢cient on Advanced education cannot be estimated precisely due to the small incidence in the sample (only
2.6%) of respondents with a technical or college degree.
114.2 Access to credit
Aside from the cash ‡ow provided by the group in the form of earnings, responses to the survey
suggest that many members value the possibility of resorting to the group for help in case of need.
This section will examine to what extent this occurs with respect to credit, i.e. what factors a¤ect
members’ access to group loans.
[Insert table 4]
Table 4 estimates the probability of borrowing from the group or from individual members in
case of need as a function of the respondents’ characteristics plus group …xed e¤ects. The dependent
v a r i a b l et a k e sv a l u e1i f ,w h e na s k e d“ I fy o un e e dal o a n ,w h od oy o ub o r r o wf r o m ? ” ,t h er e s p o n d e n t
answers “Group as a whole” or “Individual group member”. It takes value 0 if the answer is “Bank”,
“Relative”, “Friends not in the group”, or “Nobody”. The regressors are meant to control both
for demand and for supply factors, as will be clear from the discussion. Column 1 reports marginal
probit coe¢cients on demographic variables only. It is surprising that only the language dummies are
statistically signi…cant. An interesting regressor is the dummy identifying respondents that speak
the same language as the chairperson when decisions are taken by the leaders. Ceteris paribus,
speaking the language of the chairperson increases the probability of borrowing from the group or
from members by 20 percentage points, which is a very sizeable e¤ect. Column 2 adds two measures
of individual wealth, to control for the need to borrow. The …rst is a dummy equal to one if the
respondent or a relative owns a house, which for the reasons explained in section 3.1 is rather
uncommon in the informal settlements under investigation. The second is the index of durable goods
described in section 3.2. Neither index turns out to be signi…cant in column 2. While home ownership
can be considered exogenous given the small size of group loans, one could argue that ownership of
durable assets is an endogenous variable or that it is measured with error. Column 4 of table 4
reports two stage least squares estimates of a linear probability model when wealth is instrumented
with three variables: income before joining the group (in logarithm), the number of groups to
which the respondent belongs (excluding the current group), and a dummy equal to one if group
work is the main source of income for the individual. Column 3 reports the uninstrumented linear
12probability model for comparison. When wealth is instrumented, its coe¢cient becomes negative
but is still insigni…cant. The Hausman test fails to reject the joint null of weak exogeneity and no
measurement error in wealth (p-value is .24), and according to the Sargan overidenti…cation test
our instruments are valid (p-value of .36). This seems to suggest that the concerns about reverse
causation and measurement error are not warranted empirically. Notice that the “Chair’s language”
variable remains signi…cant in all cases and its coe¢cient is even bigger in the 2SLS regression.
[Insert table 5]
Apart from including group …xed e¤ects, the analysis so far has not attempted to relate ability to
borrow to any speci…c group characteristic. Table 5 addresses this point by adding to the individual
controls listed in column 2 of table 4 (not displayed) a number of group level controls. The …rst
two are measures of resources available in the group: group pro…ts per capita (which may serve as
capital to advance loans) and average wealth of group members (in case members draw upon their
own personal capital to lend to others). Neither variable has a signi…cant impact on access to credit.
The remaining variables are indexes of heterogeneity within the group.
Fragmentation indexes measure the likelihood that two randomly drawn member belong to dif-






where j represents a group, k a category, and each term skj is the share of category k in the total
membership of group j. For ethnic fragmentation, for example, the categories are Kikuyu, Luhya,
Luo, Kalenjin, Kamba, Kisii, Meru, Mijikenda, Masai, Somali, Nubian and Other. In this case, skj
is the fraction of group members speaking each of the above languages. The other fragmentation
indexes are computed in a way analogous to (2) but instead of using ethnicity we use the fraction
of individuals in a group with the same education level (No formal education, Class 1-8, Form 1-4,
Technical or College), and residential location.10 All indexes are constructed in a way that increasing
values correspond to more heterogeneity.
10The di¤erent ‘categories’ in the residential fragmentation index were the sub-areas where members resided within
each slum. For example, Korogocho was divided into Grogon, Gitadhuru, Highridge, Nyayo, Kisumu Ndogo, Ngomougo,
a n ds oo nf o rt h eo t h e rs e t t l e m e n t s .
13From the studies reviewed in section 2, both ethnic and geographic fragmentation can be ex-
pected to play a signi…cant role to the extent that they capture possibilities for information ‡ows,
monitoring and enforcement. Education fragmentation instead is usually not employed in the liter-
ature, but becomes relevant in the present study because di¤erent education levels may represent
complementary production skills. As can be seen from the table, of the fragmentation indexes only
that related to education is signi…cant: members of groups in which widespread education levels
are represented are more likely to borrow, possibly because of complementarities among members
themselves.
The last two regressors in column 1 are Gini coe¢cients of inequality either in wealth (durable
assets ownership) or in earnings from the group. It is noticeable that the latter has a negative and
highly signi…cant coe¢cient, indicating that when members earn very di¤erent amounts from group
activities it is less likely that loans are advanced either by the group as a whole or by individual
members. Column 2 expands on this result by allowing the coe¢cient on group income inequality
to di¤er depending on whether the group has positive or negative pro…ts. Interestingly, the negative
e¤ect of inequality on credit is found in groups that have …nancial di¢culties but not in those that
make positive pro…ts. In other words, having members who earn very di¤erent amounts does not
harm their ability to borrow if the pie is large enough for a number of them, while it does undermine
lending by the group or among individuals when members have to struggle over resources.
[Insert table 6]
Borrowing from the group as a whole or borrowing from individual members could make a
di¤erence, especially in the light of the above result. Table 6 reports the estimated coe¢cients from
two multinomial logit regressions in which the explanatory variables are the same as in table 5, but
the dependent variable is a categorical variable taking value 1 if in case of need the individual borrows
from the group as an ‘institution’, 2 if he or she borrows from a single member, and 0 if the lender
is outside the group. The latter is the omitted category in the table. Inequality in group earnings
decreases the likelihood of both types of loans, but is statistically signi…cant only for ‘group’ loans.
This suggests that allowing for di¤erences in remuneration of the members does not signi…cantly
14undermine their willingness and ability to lend to each other, but it does undermine the ability to
use the group as a source of credit, especially when the group runs in …nancial di¢culties (see column
2). This may be due to the di¢culty of agreeing on how to allocate the common funds when these
are very limited. The next section will look more closely at the various forms of heterogeneity among
group members and at the relationship between heterogeneity and group organization.
4.3 Heterogeneity and group organization
One of the clear patterns that emerged from the previous analysis was that certain types of het-
erogeneity had a stronger impact than others. In particular, inequality in individual earnings from
the group signi…cantly reduced the ability to borrow from the group as a whole, while inequality in
“wealth”, as measured by the index of durable goods, did not. It is useful to investigate why this is
the case.
In addition to asking about ‘objective’ wealth, the questionnaire asked each respondent the
following question: “Leaving aside the income from this group, do the members have the same
wealth?”; and prompted the following responses: “Mostly the same”, “Some di¤erences”, “Very
di¤erent”. Figure 1 relates this ‘subjective’ notion of inequality to the objective ones used in the
regressions.
[Insert …gure 1]
The vertical axis in each panel measures the fraction of members of each group saying that
members’ wealth is “very di¤erent”. The horizontal axis reports for each group the Gini coe¢cient
for individual wealth (top panel), the Gini for earnings from the group (middle panel), and the
ethnic fragmentation index (bottom panel). For example, a point such as (.23, .54) in the top panel
represents a group in which the Gini coe¢cient for wealth is .23 yet 54 percent of the members
think that di¤erences in wealth among them are substantial. The size of the circles in the …gure is
proportional to group membership: points identi…ed by larger circles correspond to larger groups.
It is quite striking how in the top panel no relationship at all emerges between the actual
level of wealth inequality and that perceived by the members. On the contrary, the middle panel
15shows that subjective inequality is positively correlated with the extent of inequality in income
received by di¤erent members from the group (the correlation between the two is .64). This result
can be rationalized by presuming that people have limited information about each other’s personal
belongings, but that they have fairly accurate information about how much each member is paid,
which matches the environmental conditions of the informal settlements and the groups surveyed
pretty closely. If subjective beliefs are formed this way, then, it is not surprising that inequality
in earnings a¤ects group functioning more than wealth inequality: members’ ability to agree on
collective outcomes may depend more on their beliefs than on their objective conditions.
The bottom panel in …gure 1 plots the fraction of people who think that members di¤er a lot
in wealth against the likelihood that two randomly drawn members of the group belong to di¤erent
ethnicities. The link between ethnicity and wealth is not obvious in this context, but it may be
that simply by considering a member as an “outsider” leads an individual to label him or her as
very di¤erent in terms of wealth. The …gure suggests a weak positive association between the two
dimensions (the correlation coe¢cient is .10). Finally, in no case the heterogeneity indexes considered
vary systematically with size, which means that higher heterogeneity does not simply capture a larger
group of participants (which may be considered a source of collective action problems).
[Insert table 7]
In the light of the above discussion it is useful to examine the impact of various dimensions of
heterogeneity on the organization of production within the group. The …rst column of table 7 reports
summary statistics on the percentage of groups that fall into di¤erent forms of organization: this pro-
vides a broad idea of the way these groups function. The same statistics are then computed splitting
the groups into ‘High’ and ‘Low’ heterogeneity depending on whether their degree of heterogeneity
is above the median or not (where the median is the index of heterogeneity of the median group).
The dimensions of heterogeneity considered are ethnic, in wealth, and in education. Inequality in
earnings from the group is omitted because it is endogenous to the organization of production chosen.
Comparing the incidence of the various organizational forms in high and low heterogeneity groups
can be a …rst step towards understanding how heterogeneity a¤ects group functioning, though such
16interpretations will have to be taken with caution, given the small number of observations on which
table 7 is based (there are only 18 di¤erent groups in the sample).
Starting from the division of labor, on average 33% of the groups assign the same task to
everybody, 45% allow for specialization, and 22% have di¤erent tasks in which the members alternate,
so that no one is systematically assigned to a given task. When we split the sample according to their
ethnic fragmentation (columns 2 and 3) the pattern is di¤erent. Highly fragmented groups tend to be
ones in which everyone does the same job, while in relatively homogeneous groups it is more common
to observe specialization in tasks. A possible explanation, which will be further advanced below, is
that when members are heterogeneous it is more di¢cult to reach consensus on something that would
generate disparities in economic treatment or in responsibilities, hence a “‡at” rule becomes more
attractive. Notice that this does not hold for heterogeneity in wealth, which, as argued above, is
likely not to be common knowledge among the members. As for education levels (columns 6-7), more
heterogeneous groups display more specialization, while in homogeneous ones everyone tends to do
the same thing. This seems reasonable, given that people with di¤erent education are ‘naturally’
suited to di¤erent tasks.
Turning to remuneration schemes, groups tend to fall into two broad categories: those that
pay a …xed amount equal for everyone (55.6%) and those that pay in proportion to the number of
items produced (33.2%). Occasionally, they pay according to the number of hours worked (5.6%)
or to the contributions made by the members when the group started (5.6%). When the sample is
split according to ethnic fragmentation, more heterogeneous groups tend to pay a ‘‡at rate’, while
more homogeneous ones pay in proportion to output. As above, this can be interpreted as resulting
from problems in reaching agreements that involve di¤erential treatment of heterogeneous members.
Results for wealth inequality go along the same lines, while those for education heterogeneity again
follow the expected allocation of ‘competence’.
Previous studies (e.g., Gugerty and Miguel (2001)) indicate the sanctioning technology as the
key mechanisms through which ethnic fragmentation a¤ects group functioning. The third panel of
table 7 reports data on the fraction of groups that employ a penalty (monetary …ne or suspension)
in case of missed contributions and in the case of absenteeism and other irregular behavior. The
17average number of times in which the given punishment was applied in the past year is also reported.
In the full sample, the percentage of groups imposing a penalty for missed contributions is 38%, and
that for irregular behavior is 47%. When these statistics are computed separately for ‘high’ and
‘low’ heterogeneity groups, we …nd that only 14% of the ethnically heterogeneous groups penalize
missed contributions, while 67% of the homogeneous ones do. Wealth inequality works in the same
direction, though the discrepancy is somewhat smaller. As for education heterogeneity, the pattern is
reversed but we have already seen that this index seems to capture skill complementarities more than
‘con‡ict’. From the number of times in which the penalty is applied, it seems that when ethnically
fragmented groups do envisage a penalty, they apply it more often than others (though this may be
due to higher need for punishment due to increased tension, as opposed to greater e¤ectiveness).11
Sanctions for absenteeism and irregular behavior seem more or less equally likely and uniformly
applied between high and low heterogeneity groups, suggesting that the e¤ect of fragmentation may
be closely related to control over economic resources.
Finally, the last panel of table 7 explores whether there is a relationship between the criteria
for recruitment and the composition of the group. For example, if new members are chosen on
the basis of their ability we may expect groups to be more heterogenous than if they are chosen
because they are ‘friends’ of other members. In the aggregate, group leaders say that the single
most important criterion to select new members is ‘commitment’ (50% of the groups), indicating the
degree of uncertainty faced in their everyday work. The remaining criteria are ability (22%), need
of the member (22%), and only in rare cases friendship (5.6%). Interestingly, no clear relationship
emerges between the recruitment criterion and the heterogeneity of the group, which may be due to
the limited importance of the ‘friendship’ factor in determining who joins. When individual members
were interviewed about the main reason for joining the group, only 6% said that they had friends in
the group. All this is comforting because it is consistent with the interpretation that the causal link
goes from heterogeneity to decision making and group performance, and not the opposite. In fact,
11The apparent inconsistency between the presence of a penalty for missed contributions and the number of times
in which it is applied may be due to measurement error, but it may also indicate that, even when in place, sanctions
in heterogeneous groups do not deter deviations, while in homogenous ones they serve a pre-emptive role.
18if group composition were the result of a ‘biased’ decision making processes, we should expect the
method of recruitment to be correlated with the degree of heterogeneity, which from table 7 is not.
5 Conclusions
Overall, the empirical evidence in this paper suggests that self-help groups are an important source
of income for certain categories of people, e.g. women. Individual earnings within the group seem
to increase with age more than with job experience (as proxied by the number of years spent in the
group), and are negatively correlated with the time spent in the current place of residence. This
probably re‡ects the precarious living conditions of the slums, which induce most skilled people to
leave if they have the opportunity to do so. Production groups also serve an insurance function by
giving access to informal credit: 64 percent of the respondents borrow from the group from individual
members in case of need. An important channel to gain access to such loans seems to be the ability
to speak the same language as the chairperson,leading to a probability increase of 20 to 25 percentage
points at the mean. Group composition a¤ects both the extent to which borrowing can be carried
out within the group, and the organization of production in terms of division of labor, compensation
schemes, and sanctioning technology. The data at hand do not allow to estimate these e¤ects
precisely, nor do they give insights into how groups get to be more or less heterogeneous. However,
they seem to suggest that fragmented groups may be limited in their choices by the need to curb
the higher potential for con‡ict within the group. To the extent that the resulting choices (lower
access to group loans, simpler production and compensation schemes, lower ability to sanction) are
suboptimal from an e¢ciency point of view, the case for understanding the roots of social cohesion
and ‘social capital’ within these groups is strengthened.
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A.1 Summary statistics
Variable No.obs. Mean Std. Dev.
Age 303 31.09 11.66
Age squared 303 1101.98 939.98
Avg wealth of group members (Ksh) 303 7367.46 5675.09
Borrow 302 .64 .48
Chair’s language 302 .06 .22
Dominant language 302 .74 .44
Educ1-8 302 .48 .50
Educ Form1-4 302 .39 .49
Educ Advanced 302 .03 .16
Educ fragmentation 303 .63 .11
Ethnic fragmentation 303 .35 .27
Female 303 .50 .50
Gini income from group 303 .22 .15
Gini wealth 303 .38 .13
Group pro…ts per capita (Ksh) 280 3271.96 7367.66
Hourly earnings from group (Ksh), ln 302 2.50 1.06
Income before group (Ksh), ln 300 4.32 3.86
Kamba 302 .36 .48
Kikuyu 302 .38 .48
Luo 302 .14 .35
Married 303 .43 .50
Own house 303 .26 .44
Wealth (Ksh) 302 7379.14 19221.42
# years in group 303 3.14 3.37
# years in group, squared 303 21.19 45.65
# years resident 303 11.64 7.69
% of total income coming from group 300 76.43 37.55
22Table 1: Basic group characteristics
Mean Min Max
Size (regular members) 14.22 6 30
Duration (yrs) 4.92 .08 16
% Female members 50% 0 100%
Only men 11.1%
Only women 33.3%
Mixed, mostly men 33.3%
Mixed, mostly women 22.2%
Members’ age 31.09 15 73
Group avg. median 28.68
Group avg. min 19.53









Basic adult educ. 2.3%
No schooling 7.9%
Members’ wealth (Ksh) 7379.1 350 197300
Group avg. median (Ksh) 5134.4
Group avg. min (Ksh) 2450
Group avg. max (Ksh) 24192.3
23Table 2: Earnings functions
Dependent variable: hourly earnings from group (ln)
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
Female -.134 -.130 -.123 -.136 -.135
(.116) (.119) (.121) (.119) (.119)
Married -.094 -.087 -.085 -.092 -.086
(.070) (.069) (.070) (.073) (.073)
Age .056¤¤ .059¤¤ .054¤¤ .059¤¤ .060¤¤
(.019) (.019) (.023) (.019) (.019)
Age squared(a) -.065¤¤ -.069¤¤ -.063¤¤ -.069¤¤ -.070¤¤
(.023) (.022) (.026) (.023) (.023)
Educ1-8 .001 -.001 .018 .014 .021
(.173) (.169) (.184) (.180) (.179)
Educ Form1-4 -.223 -.228 -.204 -.221 -.204
(.179) (.175) (.196) (.183) (.183)
Educ Advanced -.097 -.093 -.063 -.091 -.071
(.195) (.192) (.203) (.198) (.199)
# years in group .018 .004 .012 .022
(.052) (.053) (.053) (.054)
(# years in group)^2(a) -.008 .064 .024 -.034
(.318) (.321) (.322) (.327)
#y e a r sr e s i d e n t - . 0 0 9 ¤¤ -.008¤¤ -.009¤¤ -.008¤
(.004) (.004) (.004) (.004)












Constant 1.665¤¤ 1.652¤¤ 1.691¤¤ 1.795¤¤ 1.686¤¤
(.407) (.440) (.454) (.419) (.428)
No. obs. 301 301 298 301 301
Adj. R2 .72 .72 .73 .72 .72
Notes: Table reports estimated OLS coe¢cients. Robust standard errors in parenthesis.
¤ denotes signi…cance at the 10 percent level, ¤¤ at the 5 percent level.
All regressions include GROUP …xed e¤ects.
(a) Coe¢cients and standard errors multiplied by 100.
24Table 3: Dependence on group for income
Dependent variable: % of total income coming from group
[1] [2] [3] [4]
Female 11.44¤¤ 11.06¤¤ 12.35¤¤ 11.14¤¤
(4.84) (4.84) (5.05) (5.06)
Married -1.58 -1.39 -1.39 -.80
(2.97) (2.92) (3.00) (3.08)
Age -1.05 -1.05 -.94 -.34
(.73) (.73) (.54) (.74)
Age squared .011 .012 .011 .005
(.008) (.008) (.008) (.009)
Educ1-8 -3.88 -4.05 -5.21 -6.84
(4.52) (4.54) (4.81) (4.94)
Educ Form1-4 -4.72 -5.14 -6.70 -9.45¤
(5.11) (5.19) (5.39) (5.50)
Educ Advanced -7.84 -8.02 -9.51 -12.34
(10.55) (10.37) (10.50) (9.71)
# years in group -.53 -.48 -.60
(2.14) (2.17) (2.17)
(# years in group)^2 -.07 -.07 -.06
(.16) (.16) (.16)








Dominant language -3.06 -1.75
(6.87) (6.81)
ln Income before group -1.26¤¤
(.46)
Constant 96.06¤¤ 94.90¤¤ 91.29¤¤ 87.69¤¤
(14.77) (15.05) (15.39) (15.44)
No. obs. 299 299 299 296
Adj. R2 .60 .60 .60 .61
Notes: Table reports estimated OLS coe¢cients. Robust standard errors in parenthesis.
¤ denotes signi…cance at the 10 percent level, ¤¤ at the 5 percent level.
All regressions include GROUP …xed e¤ects.
25Table 4: Ability to borrow, individual determinants
Dependent variable = 1 if borrow from whole group or group member
Probit OLS 2SLS(c)
[1] [2] [3] [4]
Female -.097 -.097 -.063 -.043
(.105) (.105) (.085) (.087)
Married .002 -.003 .004 -.027
(.069) (.069) (.068) (.069)
Age -.021 -.021 -.015 -.024
(.018) (.018) (.016) (.017)
Age squared(a) .016 .016 .010 .018
(.020) (.020) (.020) (.021)
Educ1-8 -.007 -.013 -.016 -.035
(.124) (.124) (.128) (.137)
Educ Form1-4 -.135 -.142 -.114 -.025
(.141) (.141) (.140) (.155)
Educ Advanced -.151 -.171 -.138 -.045
(.253) (.249) (.197) (.211)
# years in group -.003 -.008 .001 -.019
(.045) (.045) (.037) (.045)
# years in group, squared(a) .003 .033 -.014 -.001
(.265) (.272) (.246) (.003)
# years resident -.003 -.002 -.002 -.001
(.005) (.004) (.004) (.004)
Kikuyu -.206 -.197 -.142 -.240¤
(.135) (.138) (.100) (.132)
Luo -.346¤¤ -.342¤¤ -.227¤ -.329¤¤
(.165) (.167) (.124) (.158)
Kamba -.241 -.230 -.170 -.293¤
(.161) (.162) (.130) (.168)
Chair’s language .201¤ .196¤ .215¤ .251¤¤
(.085) (.086) (.126) (.133)
Own house -.061 -.049 .152
(.102) (.084) (.180)




No. obs. 278 278 278 275
Adj. R2 .21 .21 .14 .14
Predicted P .69 .69 .64 .64
Observed P .64 .64 .64 .64
Notes: Cols. 1-2 report marginal probit coe¢cients calculated at the means; col. 3 reports
26OLS coe¢cients; and col. 4 reports two stage least squares.
Robust standard errors in parenthesis.
¤ denotes signi…cance at the 10 percent level, ¤¤ at the 5 percent level.
All regressions include GROUP …xed e¤ects.
(a) Coe¢cients and standard errors multiplied by 100.
(b) Coe¢cients and standard errors multiplied by 10,000
(c) Instruments for wealth are: income earned before joining the group (in logs), number of
other groups to which respondent belongs, dummy=1 if group is main source of income.
27Table 5: Ability to borrow, group determinants
Dependent variable = 1 if borrow from whole group or group member
[1] [2]
Group pro…ts per capita(a) -.769 -.853
(1.30) (1.27)
Avg wealth of group members(a) 2.41 3.09
(2.72) (2.99)
Ethnic fragmentation -.172 .019
(.336) (.321)
Educ. fragmentation .654¤ .792¤¤
(.382) (.357)
Residence fragmentation -.102 -.087
(.236) (.228)
Gini wealth .497 -.103
(1.02) (1.20)
Gini income from group -.735¤¤
(.375)
Gini income from grpj grp pro…ts>0 -.266
(.423)
Gini income from grpj grp pro…ts60- 1 . 0 4 ¤¤
(.453)
No. obs. 278 278
R2 .20 .21
Predicted P .67 .67
Observed P .62 .62
Notes:¤ denotes signi…cance at the 10 percent level, ¤¤ at the 5 percent level.
Marginal probit coe¢cients calculated at the means. Standard error in parenthesis are
corrected for heteroskedasticity and clustering of the residuals at the group level.
(a) Coe¢cients and standard errors multiplied by 10,000.
Controls include all those listed in column 2 of table 4.
28Table 6: Borrowing from group vs. members
[1] [2]
Source = whole group
Group pro…ts per capita(a) -.160¤¤ -.168¤¤
(.076) (.068)
Avg wealth of group members(a) .079 .136
(.142) (.180)
Ethnic fragmentation .108 1.35
(1.79) (1.75)
Educ. fragmentation 2.78 2.74
(3.00) (2.94)
Residence fragmentation -1.24 -1.21
(1.22) (1.15)
Gini wealth 3.45 -1.56
(6.04) (8.89)
Gini income from group -4.01¤¤
(1.92)
Gini income from grpj grp pro…ts>0- . 8 1 1
(2.30)
Gini income from grpj grp pro…ts60- 5 . 9 4 ¤¤
(2.61)
Source = indiv. group member
Group pro…ts per capita(a) .219¤¤ .154
(.091) (.095)
Avg wealth of group members(a) .108 .207
(.151) (.176)
Ethnic fragmentation -4.09 -2.74
(3.80) (3.70)
Educ. fragmentation -4.07 -2.59
(5.46) (5.18)
Residence fragmentation -1.87 -.390
(1.95) (2.02)
Gini wealth -3.56 -10.30
(6.28) (8.27)
Gini income from group -3.14
(2.93)
Gini income from grpj grp pro…ts>01 . 4 2
(3.97)
Gini income from grpj grp pro…ts60 -11.01
(7.01)
No. obs. 247 247
Pseudo R2 .36 .37
29Notes: Table reports estimated multinomial logit coe¢cients. Omitted category is
“Source = other”. Standard error in parenthesis are
corrected for clustering of the residuals at the group level.
¤ denotes signi…cance at the 10 percent level, ¤¤ at the 5 percent level.
(a) Coe¢cients and standard errors multiplied by 1000.
30Table 7: Organization of production and heterogeneity
full ethnic wealth education
sample heterog heterog heterog
High Low High Low High Low
% of groups with: [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7]
Division of jobs
Everyone same 33.3 45.4 14.3 22.2 44.5 22.2 44.5
Specialization 44.5 36.4 57.1 44.5 44.4 66.7 22.2
Alternate 22.2 18.2 28.6 33.3 11.1 11.1 33.3
How members paid
# items produced 33.2 22.2 33.3 22.2 33.3 44.5 11.1
# hours worked 5.6 11.1 11.1 0 11.1 11.1 11.1
Fixed amount, same for all 55.6 66.7 44.5 66.7 44.5 44.4 66.7
Their contributions 5.6 0 11.1 11.1 11.1 0 11.1
Penalty for missed contributions .38 .14 .67 .20 .50 .60 .25
# times applied 3.7 9 0.6 8.3 1 1.2 6.2
Penalty for irregular behavior .47 .55 .37 .37 .55 .44 .50
# times applied 3.2 2.9 3.5 2.6 3.7 3.3 3.1
How members recruited
Ability 22.2 22.2 22.2 22.2 22.2 22.2 22.2
Need 22.2 22.2 22.2 11.1 33.3 22.2 22.2
Commitment 50.0 55.6 44.5 55.6 44.5 55.6 44.5
Friendship 5.6 0 11.1 11.1 0 0 11.1
31Figure 1:  Subjective versus objective heterogeneity
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